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Book Review
Reviewed by Jacob M. Fridline*
LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS, by Robert E. Keeton.
Published by Ohio State University Press; 137 pp. (1963).
For students seeking an introduction to the diverse subject
of legal cause, this small volume should be profitable. Although
legal or "proximate" causation stands out as the very foundation
in the determination of liability in negligence cases, it has re-
mained an extremely nebulous concept. In the case of most
students, early attempts to acquire a broader perspective of this
complex problem often result in confusion and a retreat to
the comfortable "but-for" rule. This is understandable, for as
Professor Keeton points out, the rules with respect to legal cause
have failed to evolve a pattern which is precise yet not rigid,
flexible yet not arbitrary. After this disclosure, the author ap-
proaches the subject primarily as a critical examination of cur-
rent views, extensions of existing rules, and trends in the de-
velopment of new principles.
The book is arranged in three sections. Part One is mainly
an investigation of the basic principles of liability in negligence
cases. Professor Keeton refers to this as the Risk Rule which he
dissects via the classic "exploding-rat-poison-on-the-stove" case.
He first discusses the prevailing "but-for" or "sine qua non"
rule. The ambiguity of this rule gives rise to his opinion that
liability should be based upon the "negligent aspect of the con-
duct" which causes harm. A variation on this theme points to the
element of foreseeability. The remainder of this section is a con-
trast of the Risk Rule applications with other principles, high-
lighted by discussions of the Palsgraf and Polemis cases and an
analysis of the Restatement view of legal cause.
Although Part Two purports to depict the various applica-
tions of the Risk Rule concept, it is more of an examination of
classic deviations, extensions, and limitations. Since the de-
termination of liability with respect to scope of risk is by its
nature quite fact-oriented, it is only by a study of selected "type"
cases that one can acquire sufficient understanding for accurate
prediction. A very interesting and notable inclusion in this sec-
tion is Professor Keeton's explanation of various factors which
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account for deviation from the Risk Rule. Public policy and a
general tendency in the direction of expanded liability are two
such factors which are examined.
The subject of termination of risk is one area where the
author recommends a return to the Risk Rule. Although the
trend here is toward a limitation of liability, the author feels that
reasoning with regard to intervening and superseding cause may
not stand up well to a causation-in-fact analysis.
In Part Three, "Battle Fronts in the Law of Causation," three
factors influencing the trend toward strict liability are delineated.
All are the subject of continuing dispute. The first merely sum-
marizes the ever-expanding scope of liability concept which the
author treated in depth in the preceding section. A tendency
toward a very broad description of risk is now quite obvious. An
equally prominent factor is pointed out with respect to judicial
supervision of jury findings on questions concerning description
of risk. Courts seem to shy away from their rightful authority
and duty in the re-examination of jury verdicts. The author is
not alone in his opinion that many such questions should be ruled
upon as a matter of law, rather than left for jury determination.
As third factor, he indicates the "directly-traceable-conse-
quences" rule which naturally tends toward strict liability. The
author prefers general adherence to the Risk Rule, but acknowl-
edges that the former rule, when discriminatingly applied, is very
often more suitable to modern circumstances.
Professor Keeton does not claim to present an exhaustive
treatise on the subject of causation, but he provides the reader
with a basic understanding of the concept of legal cause terms.
Therefore, I feel that the book would be of considerable value
to the beginning law student. Most of the case examples are those
which are likely to be studied in detail by such students in ele-
mentary tort law. For those seeking a more thorough investiga-
tion of the subject, the use of the book in conjunction with an
examination in depth of its footnotes would be recommended.
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